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Article

The 'We' in 'Me': An Account of Minimal Relational Selfhood

Details

Citation

Higgins J (2020) The 'We' in 'Me': An Account of Minimal Relational Selfhood. Topoi, 39 (3), p. 535¨C546. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9564-2

Abstract
Many philosophers contend that selfhood involves a uniquely first-personal experiential dimension, which precedes any form of socially dependent selfhood. In this paper, I do not wish to deny the notion of such a ¡°minimal¡± experiential dimension as encapsulating the very givenness of experience as for a certain subject, such that experiences are accessible to this subject in a way that they are not for others. However, I do wish to deny any temptation to view minimal experiential selfhood as ontogenetically more primitive than socially constituted selfhood. That is, the ¡®thinnest¡¯ construal of minimal experiential selfhood fails to properly account for characteristics that are essential to human selfhood; namely, the intimate, embodied interactions that unfold at the incipient moments of human life. I argue that taking the ontogenesis of embodied human existence seriously involves accepting the de facto equiprimordiality of minimal experientialiasm with a ¡®minimal¡¯ form of relational selfhood, i.e. the co-constitution of experience through engagements with others.

Keywords
Minimal selfhood; Social constitution; Embodiment; Shared experience; Mother¨Cinfant interaction

Journal
Topoi: Volume 39, Issue 3

StatusPublished
Publication date31/07/2020
Publication date online14/05/2018
Date accepted by journal14/05/2018
URL
ISSN0167-7411
eISSN1572-8749

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